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THE LAW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
DAVID ZISKINDt
What are commonly called "fringe benefits" in union agreements
are formed out of threads taken from many parts of the fabric of law:
a large skein of contract law; binding threads from the law of trusts,
agency and taxation; and many colorful strands from a host of labor
law statutes. The legal principles are for the most part not unique
or novel. Rather, the accumulation of new economic and social ar-
rangements has brought together a variety of familiar legal rules
that take on the appearance of a system or body of interrelated legal
doctrines. In light of the current Congressional investigations, there
may soon be special legislation for employee benefit plans. Such legis-
lation will be woven from threads of the present law on the subject;
hence, this paper will undertake to trace the salient filaments of that
law.
THE BASIC AGREEMENTS
Benefit plans resulting from collective bargaining rest on formal
agreements. They may be spelled out in a single document or several.
Usually the union agreement provides merely for a commitment or
undertaking to establish certain types of benefits. Further details are
set forth in another agreement-often a trust agreement or indenture.
This is commonly implemented by insurance policies and other con-
tracts. Specimen forms of the basic agreement have been collated and
reprinted by the United States Department of Labor, manufacturers'
associations and publishers of standard law services.1 The following
outline of the contents of employee benefit plans is presented as a
check list for legal draftsmen and as a basis for discussion of the
contractual principles involved.
TYPE OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
In designating the benefits to be provided by a welfare plan, the
parties may choose from a wide range of possibilities. Common bene-
fits fall within the following:
1. Stipulated insurance payments made on designated misfortunes.
a) On deatI
t Member of the California Bar.
1. See, e.g., Health, Insurance, and Pensions, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PRO-
-VISIONS BULL. No. 908-17 (U.S. Dep't of Labor 1949); DIGEST OF SELECTED
HEALTH, INSURANCE, WELFARE AND RETIREMENT PLANS UNDER COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING (U.S. Dep't of Labor 1950); DIGEST OF SELECTED HEALTH, INSURANCE,
WELFARE AND RETIREMENT PLANS UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, Spec. Series
No. 6 (U.S. Dep't of Labor 1951); FRIEDsoN & ZISuAN, NINETEEN EMPLOYEE-
BENEFIT PLANS IN THE AIRFRAME INDUSTRY, Bur. Memo. 71 (Fed. Sec. Agcy, Soc.
Sec. Adm'n 1951); HANDBOOK ON PENSIONS (Nat. Ind. Conf. Bd, Inc. 1950);
CCH PENS. PLAN GUIDE; P-H PENS. & PROFIT SHARING.
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b) On accidental death or dismemberment.
c) On each week of incapacity due to nonoccupational illness
or accident.
2. Payments made for expenses of illness.
a) These may be in cash or in the rendering of services.
b) The services paid for or supplied may be one or more of the
following:
(1) Doctors' office calls, home calls; (2) Hospital room,
operating room, ambulance, anaesthetics, drugs, X rays,
laboratory tests; (3) Surgery; (4) Maternity care; (5)
Christian Science, chiropractor or other healing arts;
(6) Dental care; (7) Care of special afflictions such as
mental illness and self-inflicted disabilities.
c) These benefits may be in addition to or in place of state dis-
ability insurance.
d) Dependents may be excluded or given designated benefits.
3. Payments made on retirement from employment.
a) These are usually on attainment of a certain age, after em-
ployment for a certain length of time and/or on retirement
due to physical disability.
b) Payments may be uniform or graduated on the basis of length
of service, age, sex or prior earnings.
c) Payments may be of an assured amount or a right to par-
ticipate in whatever funds are available.
d) The right to benefits may be vested in increasing amounts
after completion of certain periods of service.
e) Retirement may be compulsory or optional.
f) Payments may be in adidtion to or in place of social security
payments.
g) Payments may also be made to surviving dependents, usually
with a reduction in the amount of annuity.
ELIGIBILITY OF BENEFICIARIES
Eligibility for benefits under welfare plans is ordinarily determined
by standards such as the following:
1. Beneficiaries may be limited to employees within a firm, in-
dustry, trade, craft or a collective bargaining unit.
2. Beneficiaries may be limited to members in good standing of a
union.
3. Active or regular employment is usually required. Temporary,
part-time, seasonal and probationary employees may be expressly
excluded.
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4. Some length of service is usually required.
a) This may be a certain number of hours or days in a preceding
qualifying period.
b) For pensions, this is ordinarily a number of years.
5.- Age may be a qualifying or disqualifying factor.
a) Advanced age may exempt a person from life insurance or
other insurance benefits.
b) The age of 65 is customarily required for retirement with
optional privileges at lower annuities for persons of 62, 60
or 55.
6. A combination of age and length of service may be required for
retirement benefits.
7. Physical disability may be accepted as a substitute for age or
length of service in qualifying for a reduced pension.
8. Minimum earnings may be a basis for determining eligibility
for benefits and the amount of prior earnings may be a basis for
computing the amount of a pension.
FINANCING
Financing of employee benefit plans is commonly provided for as
follows:
1. The plan is either noncontributory (supported solely by the
employery or contributory (supported in part by the employer
and in part by employees).
a) Some benefits may be on a noncontributory basis, and others
or higher benefits or benefits for dependents may be on a
contributory basis.
b) Employee contributions may be obligatory or optional.
2. Contributions are specified.
a) As a flat sum weekly, monthly or annually for each employee
(to be carefully defined).
b) As a lump sum or a percentage of cost.
c) As a percentage of pay roll or wages (to be carefully de-
fined).
d) As a percentage, of employer's contribution, or on a matching
basis.
e) In different amounts related to employees' sex or age.
S. A fiscal policy may be declared.
a) To keep benefits within the purchasing power of the con-
tributions.
b) To provide benefits on an actuarially sound basis.
c) To maintain a reserve for safety.
d) To proceed tentatively and to rely upon the discretion of
trustees.
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ADMINISTRATION
The administration of employee benefit plans is varied almost in-
finitely, but the essential components are the following:
1. Method of underwriting.
a) Benefits are paid directly from the fund or through insurance
policies. If insurance is used, policies are purchased through
the fund or directly by employers.
b) Benefits are paid in cash or rendered as services. If paid in
cash, they may be paid as fiat sums or as reimbursements of
expenditures or bills incurred.
2. Administrative personnel.
a) For policy control.
1. Trustees-a representative of the union alone, or the union
and the employer, or the union, the employer and a neutral.
2. Advisory council, insurance consqljtants and attorneys may
be added.
b) For day to day administration.
1. Insurance company may handle claims.
2. An administrator or office manager may collect contribu-
tions and/or handle claims.
3. Policy control usually includes:
a) Determination of types and quantities of benefits to procure.
b) Determination of rules for eligibility of employees.
c) Purchase of insurance.
d) Investment of funds.
4. Day to day administration usually involves:
a) Collection of contributions.
b) Handling of claims, payment of benefits, handling of com-
plaints.
Rarely are all of these spelled out in written agreements. Frequently
they are all left to the discretion of trustees who design and redesign
the administration within the limits of the agreements creating their
office.
FUND SAFEGUARDS
Special clauses for the protection of the funds or assets of employee
benefit plans are usually written along the following lines:
1. Expenditures may be limited to specified purposes or benefits.
2. Administrative expenses may be limited to a percentage of con-
tributions.
3. Expenditures for certain purposes, such as strike benefits, may
be prohibited.
4. Services of employer and union representatives may be required
gratis.
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5. Title to all assets may be placed in trustees and expressly denied
to employer, employees and union.
6. Contributions may be made nonreturnable.
7. Benefits may be made nonassignable except to approved hospi-
tals or doctors.
8. Investment of funds may be limited to government securities or
to investment trust companies.
9. Periodic reports, audits and access to records may be required.
10. Delinquent contributions may be increased by fines and collection
costs, including attorneys' fees.
11. Delinquent contributors may be made subject to court action,
unfair listing, strikes and the requirement of good behavior
bonds.
12. Defaulting employers may be made liable for benefits denied
their unprotected employees.
- EMPLOYEE SAFEGUARDS
Special clauses for the protection of the union or employees in em-
ployee benefit agreements frequently provide the following:
1. Employee may convert group insurance to an individual policy
at his own expense upon temporary layoff, discharge or retire-
ment.
2. Coverage shall hold over for a period of time after termination
of employment or other loss of eligibility.
3. Eligibility may be acquired through employment by any em-
ployer within an area or industry.
4. Reimbursement may be received for covered expenditures made
out-of-town during vacations.
5. Involuntary retirement may be made only with just cause.
6. Annuity rights may be vested at stated periods.
7. If social security or state disability payments overlap private
benefits, the funds will be used for other benefits.
8. Disputes may be handled through ordinary grievance and arbi-
tration procedures.
EMPLOYER SAFEGUAIDS
Special clauses for the protection of employers commonly incorpo-
rated into employee benefit agreements have the following objectives:
1. Protection against increased costs.
a) Stipulated contributions are expressly" made maximum.
b) A limitation is placed on total cost of all benefits.
c) The union or employees are required to pay excess costs.
2. Employer is made not responsible for default of insurance cariier
or trustees.
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3. "Favored Nations" clause-contributions are not to exceed those
required of competitors.
4. Adjustments are to be made for overlapping social security or
state benefits-contributions or benefits are to be reduced
accordingly.
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS AS CONTRACTS
The several agreements comprising employee benefit plans are
governed basically by the rules of law applicable to contracts. Factual
situations more or less peculiar to employee benefit plans have posed
special problems, and these have given rise to a group of court de-
cisions on the interpretation and enforcement of such plans as con-
tracts.
Parties Covered. Which employees were intended to benefit from a
plan has at times been uncertain. Particularly, the coverage of non-
union employees in contracts negotiated by unions has been ques-
tioned. The general language of one union agreement was held to
embrace union members and all those who might perform the work
regularly done by union members, whether members or not.2 SiMi-"
larly, a plan to include "all workers" was held to include nonunion
as well as union men.2
The status of executive, administrative and special employees has
also been in doubt. A welfare agreement which referred to "all em-
ployees" was held to cover foremen and "permit men." However,
express provisions of an agreement excluding executive and other
white-collar workers were interpreted to deny them coverage.$
In a few instances, employers have sought to deny that they were
parties to welfare agreements. A mine operator, who had signed no
welfare contract, but who was a member of a trade association, made
payments under a 1948 agreement signed by the association. He ac-
knowledged his obligation to pay under a similar 1949 agreement and
later declined to honor the association's 1950 agreement. The court
held that he had created the appearance of being a party to the agree-
ment and had thereby induced the union to refrain from striking his
mine; therefore, he was estopped from denying that he was a party
to the agreement.6 A restaurant owner who signed a basic pension
agreement negotiated by his employers' association was held a party
to a new agreement concluded under a reopening clause in the first,
even though he had not signed the latter."
2. Matthews v. Jeremiah Burns, Inc., 129 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
3. In re Martinelli, 132 N.Y.L.J. 9, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 23, 1954).
4. Matthews v. Jeremiah Burns, Inc., 129 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
5. In re Compania De Los Ferrocarriles, 76 F. Supp. 521 (P.R. 1948).
6. Lewis v. Cable, 107 F. Supp. 196 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
7. In -re Alamac Restaurant, Inc., 203 Misc. 463, 119 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Sup. Ct.
1953).
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Eligibility of Beneficiaries. The uncertainty of contract provisions
has caused some difficulty in determining the eligibility of employees
for benefits. Since employees are often a fluid group, the time and
status of their employment have been significant. A plan that provided
for persons "who are either now in the employment of the employer
or may be hereafter employed" was held to confer benefits not upon
those who resigned or were discharged, but only upon those who re-
mained in the employment.8 That ruling was applied to the exhaustion
of a welfare fund even after the termination of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. In another case involving the application of a
pension plan by the receivers of a railroad, persons who had qualified
by age and length of service were held eligible for benefits even though
they were later discharged or resigned. 9 As a general rule, employees
who have been discharged before they established their eligibility
have not been entitled to benefits. 0
A special problem has arisen with respect to employees who have
refused to be discharged merely because they have reached the retire-
ment age. Involuntary retirement has been construed to be a dis-
charge. One court expressed the significance of volition in such mat-
ters by the aphorism, "Children are put to bed, adults retire."1 When
a union agreement permitted discharge only for cause, involuntary
retirement under a separate pension plan was held a breach of con-
tract.12
The extent to which pension plan trustees may exercise their dis-
cretion in applying eligibility standards has been the subject of a few
decisions. An agreement required the attainment of a certain age
and certain years of service for a pension; an employee took two days
off for illness and immediately thereafter the mine where he worked
was shut down by a strike; during the strike he reached retirement
age and the trustees sought to disqualify him because the continuity
of his employment had been broken. The court found the discrepancy
too trivial2 3 In another case, the pension plan was confined to union
8. Del Veccio v. Hood, 4 N.J. Super. 254, 256, 66 A.2d 738, 739 (1949).
9. Vallejo v. American R.R., 188 F.2d 513 (Ist Cir. 1951).
10. Gelhaus v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 194 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1952); Bos v.
United States Rubber Co., 100 Cal. App. 2d 565, 224 P.2d 386 (1950); Pullano v.
Aluminum & Magnesium, Inc., 24 CCH LAB. CAS. 67,983 (Ohio 1953), appeal
dismissed, 160 Ohio St. 206, 115 N.E.2d 4 (1953).
11. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Div., G.E.
Co., 17 CCH LAB. CAS. 65,350 (Ohio 1949).
12. United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997 (7th Cir.
1952); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Div? G.E.
Co., 17 CCH LAB. CAS. 65,350 (Ohio 1949). In Bakery and Confectionery
Workers v. National Biscuit Co., 78 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1948), the court
upheld a compulsory retirement against a union's insistence that it be po3tponed
until a pension plan was negotiated.
13. Bednar v. UMW Welfare and Retirement Fund, 25 CCH LAB. CAS. 1 68,352(D.C. 1953).
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members; the union constitution prohibited membership to anyone
who sold intoxicating liquor; a miner left the mines because of ill-
health and operated a saloon; the union continued to accept his dues
and thereafter he reached retirement age. The pension agreement
gave the trustees "full authority" on matters of eligibility, but the
court held that "full authority" was not synonymous with absolute or
unlimited discretion. Thus, the union was deemed to have waived its
constitutional prohibition by accepting dues and the trustees were
required to pay the pension.1' Where eligibility for a pension rested
upon the recommendation of a medical staff, however, the require-
ment that an employee have a permanent illness not compensable
under a workmen's compensation law was upheld.15
Beneflt Rights. The concept of an agreement normally implies the
existence of rights and obligations; but the practice of providing
many aspects of employee benefit plans through separate documents,
resolutions and communications has led to dispute over what rights,
if any, have been created. Early welfare plans were promulgated by
employers unilaterally, and many expressly stated that they were
mere gratuities, that no rights were vested in the employees, and that
the plans were subject to modification or abandonment within the sole
discretion of the employer.16 In some instances, however, courts recog-
nized that unilateral welfare plans were in the nature of continuing
offers, subject to acceptance by employees through a continuation of
their work on an implied condition that the plan would be continued.
Under those circumstances, the employees acquired enforceable rights
to the benefits.11 In some instances, companies were estopped from
invoking voluntary provisions unknown to employees or inconsistent
with representations of company officials.'s When collective bargain-
ing agreements incorporated or referred to welfare plans, it was
14. Forrish v. Kennedy, 377 Pa. 370, 105 A.2d 67 (1954).
15. Bromberg v. United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp., 19 CCH LAB. CAs. 66,203(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951). McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 32 App. Div. 610, 53 N.Y.
Supp. 98 (4th Dep't 1898), involved a unilateral plan. The majority of the court
upheld the trustees' determination of eligibility; but a dissent stated that the
trustees must act in accord with rules and regulations established by the agree-
ment and must have cause for their conduct.
16. Hughes v. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 21 CCH LAB. CAS. 66,747
(N.D. Ill. 1952) ; McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 32 App. Div. 610, 53 N.Y. Supp.
98 (4th Dep't 1898); Pullano v. Aluminum & Magnesium, Inc., 24 CCH LAB. CAS.1 67,983 (Ohio 1953), appeal dismissed, 160 Ohio St. 206, 115 N.E.2d 4 (1953).
17. Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711 197 P.2d 307 (1948) ; Bromberg v.
United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp., 19 CCH A6. CAS. 1 66,203 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1951); Schofield v. Zion's Co-op. Mercantile Institution, 85 Utah 281, 39 P.2d 342
(1934) Gilbert v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 114 W. Va. 344, 171 S.E. 814 (1933).
18. Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 197 P.2d 807 (1948) - Henderson
v. Railroad Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 272 App. Div. 893, 71 V.Y.S.2d 96(1st Dep't 1947). In Bos v. United States Rubber Co., 100 Cal. App. 2d 565, 224
P.2d 386 (1950), there was no proof that the employee had no knowledge of a
written plan, or that oral representations were made in bad faith.
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obvious that they were obligatory plans.1 Under contracts between
an employer and insurance companies for annuities, it would seem
that employees are to be treated as third party beneficiaries.20
The benefits to which employees are entitled are ordinarily explicit;
but the courts have been called upon to define them. A union agree-
ment provided for the payment of pensions to qualified employees
"during their lives." After the qualification of some employees, the
agreement terminated. The court found the agreement displayed a
manifest intent to require the employer to continue the annuities for
the balance of the lives of those who had qualified within the life of
the employment contract.2 1 A negotiated agreement providing for
group insurance was held to require the employer to pay for that
insurance even though he had purchased similar insurance under a
private arrangement.2 2 Whether an employee benefit plan is intended
to supplement workmen's compensation, state disability insurance or
social security payments is considered below.23
Administration Problems. The administration of employee benefit
plans is governed by rules of agency and trusts. Pertinent rules of
trust are set forth below.2' The agency situations do not appear to
have resulted in court decisions.
ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS
Actions to Collect Contributions. The liability of employers for
coitributions 'is ordinarily undeniable ;25 but a problem of calculation
was presented by a contract that called for contributions as a per-
centage of the "entire payroll." An issue was raised as to the obliga-
tion of the employer to pay on extra compensation for overtime, and
the court held that he was required to do so.26
Further difficulty has arisen when a defaulting employer has been
insolvent or in receivership. A corporation that rendered itself in-
solvent by purchasing its own stock did so in contravention of state
laws, and welfare plan trustees were allowed a preference over the
claims of the former stockholder who sought to be paid for the stock
he had sold to the corporation.2 7 A railroad company made deductions
from the wages of its employees but failed to turn them over to an
insurance company before the railroad went into receivership. The
19. Vallejo v. American R.R., 188 F.2d 513 (Ist Cir. 1951).
20. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 133, 134 (illustration 4), 135, 140 (illus-
tration 4) (1932) ; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 367-369 (rev. ed. 1936).
21. N.Y. City Omnibus Corp. v. Quill, 297 N.Y. 832, 78 N.E.2d 859 (1948)(mem. decision).
22. In re Martinelli, 132 N.Y.L.J. 9, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 23, 1954).
23. See pp. 141-143, 147-150 infra
24. See pp. 122-125 infr.
25. See note 22 supra.
26. Matthews v. Jeremiah Burns, Inc., 129 N.Y.S.2d 841, 844 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
27. Jarroll Coal Co. v. Lewis, 210 F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 1954).
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court held that there was no trust in the funds while in the hands of
the employer and the insurance company had only the rights of an
ordinary creditor.26
A special dilemma in the collection of contributions was presented
by three cases involving contracts negotiated by the International
Woodworkers of America. The contracts differed in certain respects
but all of them provided a wage increase of seven and one half cents
an hour and then authorized the employer to pay the same amount to
a health and welfare fund. In each case a number of employees ob-
jected to the contribution and demanded that the money be paid to
them as increased wages.
The first case arose in Idaho and the court held that though the
seven and one half cents was probably an increase in wages, it was
provided by a collective bargaining agreement for the specific pur-
pose of financing an employees' benefit program; the contribution did
not result in a loss of wages; on the contrary, it involved a gain of
benefits; hence,- it could not be recovered or enjoined.29 The second
case arose in Oregon. The court said that the Oregon case differed
factually from the Idaho case, but indicated merely that prior to the
designation of an insurance company which was to receive the
premiums for the employee insurance, the employer had paid the
money directly to the employees. The court stressed its interpretation
that this was not "an employer paid plan" and then went on to rule
that the union had no authority to direct how wages should be spent
without the express authorization of its members. The court said that
"[n]o matter how laudable the cause ... it would certainly be an
opening wedge for eventual dangerous control by... [unions] over
the expenditures of the individual employee's wages."30 The third
case arose in California. The contract in that case provided explicitly
for written authorization of the employees, and in the absence of such
authorization, the contributions were not permitted. Since the Labor
Code of California prohibited wage deductions without written au-
thorization of the employees, the court also refused to reform the
agreement on the possible basis of a mistake.31 Some trustees and
unions have expressed a desire to regard employer contributions as
wages in order to take advantage of state wage collection laws; these
cases illustrate vividly, however, the need for careful consideration
of the kickback and wage assignment laws as well. 2
28. Continental Casualty Co. v. Powell, 83 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1936).
29. Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. International Woodworkers of America, 108 F.
Supp. 906 (N.D. Idaho 1951).
30. Coos Bay Lumber Co. v. International Woodworkers of America, 22 CCH
LAB. CAS. 1 67,144 (Ore. 1952).
31. International Woodworkers of America v. McCloud River Lumber Co., 119
F. Supp. 475 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
32. Kickback and wage assignment laws are discussed on pp. 139, 140 infra.
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Actions to Collect Benefits. Although most actions to recover
benefits under plans established by collective bargaining have been
brought by trade unions, 3 the courts have permitted individual em-
ployees to sue in their own names. 3' A union has been held to be with-
out authority to bargain away a former member's pension rights so
as to deprive him of the right to recover the pension himself. 3 An
employee who took a refund of his contributions to a pension plan
and signed a release was clearly barred from recovering a pension."
. In suits against trustees to enforce benefit claims there has been a
problem of acquiring jurisdiction. Service on one of several trustees
has been said to be sufficient only in an action based upon wrong-
.doing on his part.3 7 There has been dictum to the effect that, in order
to hold the other trustees personally liable or to enjoin their action,
service must be had on all of the trustees38 However, even if service is
properly made, it has been held that a suit seeking to seize or tie up
the funds of a welfare plan had to be brought in the state where the
funds were kept 39  -
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS AS TRUSTS
Employee benefit plans negotiated in collective bargaining almost
invariably involve elements of a trust. Except in situations in. which
insurance is purchased directly by employers, there is some provision
for the accumulation of funds and their expenditure for the benefit of
persons other than the donor. By operation of law, a trust will in-
here in that relationship regardless of the organizational devices and
techniques employed. However, most employee benefit plans are now
consciously prepared with the Labor-Management Relations Act
(LMRA)4' in mind and an express trust is created. Contributions
are made by an employer (with or without employee contributions)
33. See, e.g., AFL v. Western Union Tel. Co., 179 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1950). See
notes 124-127 infra. In cases in which union agreements have followed unilateral
welfare plans and have not expressly referred to such plans, the arbitration clause
in the union agreement has not been available for the adjudication of disputes
involving welfare matters. -American Federation of Grain Millers v. Allied Mills,
Inc., 196 Misc. 517, 91 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Grocery Warehousemen v.
Kroeger Co., 17 CCH LAB. CAS. 65,443 (Pa. 1949).
S4. Nichols v. National Tube Co., 122 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Ohio 1954) (This
was obviously the case under* unilateral welfare plans.); Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Hughes, 228 Fed. 885 (4th Cir. 1915); McLemore v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
88 Ore. 228, 171 Pac. 390 (1918).
35. Nichols v. National Tube Co., supra note 34.
36. Gelhaus v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 194 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1952).37. Kane v. Lewis, 282 App. Div. 529, 125 N.Y.S.2d 544 (3d Dep't 1953); Fried-
man v. Hall, 24 CCH LAD. CAS. 68,092 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); Hobbs v. Lewis,
26 CCH LAB. CAs. 68,599 (Tenn. 1954).
38. See Kane v. Lewis, 282 App. Div. 529, 530, 125 N.Y.S.2d 544, 546 (3d Dep't
1953).
39. Kane v. Lewis, 282 App. Div. 529, 125 N.Y.S.2d 544 (3d Dep't 1953) ; Fried-
man v. Hall, 24 CCH LAB. CAS. 68,092 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); Hobbs v. Lewis,
26 CCH LAB. CAS. % 68,599 (Tenn. 1954)'.
40. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
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to trustees for designated benefits to employees. Powers and duties
of the trustees are stipulated. But apart from, or in addition to, such
contractual arrangements, there are common law and statutory rules
of trust that apply.
Rules of Fiduciary Relationship. Most significant are the rules
emanating from the fiduciary relationship. Those rules require trus-
tees to be personally disinterested in their trust, to administer their
trust faithfully and honestly, to disclose to the beneficiaries all infor-
mation the trustees may have that may be necessary for the protection
of the trust; to preserve trust funds and to take certain steps to aug-
ment them; to carry out the express purposes of the trust; and to
refrain from waste, damage or personal aggrandizement. They de-
mand the exercise of devotion to the interests of the beneficiaries far
beyond the requirements of ordinary business transactions. They
carry the moral implications of trust over to the legal obligations
of trustees.41
The courts have been called upon to expound these principles in
only a few cases involving employee benefit plans; yet, it is clear that
these fundamental rules of trusts apply to such plans. In one case
the court said it "considers such funds as rather sacred."'42 In an-
other, the court went beyond the facts before it to remonstrate:
The burdening of the fund with undue administrative expenses
or lush salaries for union officials will not be tolerated; excessive
restrictions, either in the insurance policies or the by-laws and
regulations, or the providing of small benefits to the employee-
members in proportion to the amount contributed by the em-
ployee-parties or the premiums paid, taking into consideration
the risk involved, will cause more than a lifting of the eyebrows."
Recent reports of the misuse of trust funds by trustees suggest the
commission of crimes such as embezzlement or misappropriation of
funds. 4 The availability of criminal laws to deal with those situations
is obvious. The fiduciary relationship, however, imposes obligations
at the opposite end of moral behavior-positive obligations to protect,
conserve and augment, to prosecute and perpetuate, to disclose and to
avoid conflicting interests. And the remedies of declaratory judg-
ments and injunctions apparently are available to clarify or to enforce
those fiduciary obligations in employee benefit plans.45
Rules of Charitable Trusts. There is dictum to the effect that em-
41. 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 541-544 (1946); 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS §§
163A-185 (1939).
42. United Garment Workers v. Jacob Reed's Sons, 83 F. Supp. 49, 52 (E.D.
Pa. 1949).
43. Upholsterers' Int'l Union v. Leathercraft Furniture Co., 82 F. Supp. 570,
575 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
44. Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor on H.R. 115, 83d Cong,
2d Sess. (1954) (Investigation of Welfare Funds and Racketeering).
45. See Van Horn v. Lewis. 79 F. Supp. 541, 545 (D.C. 1948).
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ployee benefit trusts are charitable trusts. The miners' welfare and
retirement fund was called "a beneficial charitable trust" in connec-
tion with the sufficiency of a majority decision of the board of trus-
tees. 4 6 It has also been suggested by serious students of trusts that
employee pension trusts should be deemed to be charitable trusts-at
least for the purpose of avoiding the rule against perpetuities.'T A
logical argument can be made to the effect that most, if not all, em-
ployee benefit trusts are for charitable or public purposes and not for
the personal gain of the employer contributors. Whether, in the long
run, all the purposes of employee benefit plans would be served by
dealing with them as charitable trusts-with the concept of the cy pres
doctrine instead of the industrial notion that the employee bene-
ficiaries might have something to say about the modification of their
benefits-is a question perhaps best left to further experience.
Rules against Perpetuities and Accumulations. Trusts, having
developed historically under an atmosphere of discouragement, were
burdened with restrictive rules that have not yet been eliminated.
The rule against perpetuities required title in property to vest in the
beneficiaries within 21 years after the death of the last survivor of
those living at the time of the trust's creation-thereby terminating
the trust. A similar time limitation was placed upon the accumulation
of trust income. These rules, with various modifications, obtain in
most states today. Twenty-four states have statutes exempting em-
ployees' trusts from the rule against perpetuities.' 8 Statutes exempt-
ing accumulations of employee trusts from common law restrictions
are fewer.4 9 Employee benefit plans under collective bargaining are
probably too young to have experienced court litigation under these
rules; and it may be well to press for remedial legislation or forjudicial exemption through a construction of employee benefit trusts
as charitable trusts in order to avoid trouble in the future.
Rules against Indefinite Beneficiaries. A common law rule of trusts
has required the beneficiaries to be definitely ascertainable. Not so
for charitable trusts. Since employee benefit trusts have a fluctuating
group of beneficiaries, often with inchoate interests at any particular
time, such trusts may conflict with that rule. A number of state
statutes have exempted employees' trusts from the requirement of
46. Ibid.
47. Lauritzen, Perpetuities and Pension Trusts, 24 TAXES 519 (June 1946).
48. Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. CCR PENS. PLAN GUIDE 7 1116 (1954);
P-H PENS. & PROFIT SHARING 6206 (1954).
49. Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, RhodeIsland and Wisconsin. CCH PENS. PLAN GUIDS 1116 (1954); P-H PENS. &
PROFIT SHARING 16206 (1954).
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definitely ascertainable beneficiaries, but here too the concept of a
charitable trust may help. 0
Rules on Trust Investments. There have been numerous statutes
restricting the type of investments that might be made by trusts. The
early approach was to list the permitted classes of investments. These
included government securities, first mortgages, some corporate
bonds, but excluded corporate stocks. Some states continuing their
legal lists have expanded them to include some stocks.51 Another ap-
proach has been to permit trustees to purchase whatever investments
a prudent man would make for the permanent investment of his own
funds. The prudent man theory is now law in approximately half the
states.52 A third approach has been to spread risk through use of
common trust funds,5 3 and, recently, a fourth approach has been to
permit trustees to invest by purchasing shares in investment com-
panies.54
The power of trustees to invest the funds of an employee benefit
plan was tested in a recent case.5 Pension funds were loaned by the
trustees to employees in limited amounts and with security in the
nature of a lien against the employee's accumulated annuity interests.
The court noted that the LAIRA, by referring to the "income" from
funds, contemplated that such trust funds might be invested. It held
the loans to be prudent investments, but took occasion to state:
Certainly it would not be within the law for trustees to permit
the interested members to destroy such trust funds to the end
that when a retirement should be available, the member would.
have already used and made way with the funds, and, therefore,
the purpose of the law would be vitiated. ... [I]t is the purpose
of the law that they be available when due under the contract "
50. See text following note 49 supra.
51. District of Columbia, Indiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Wisconsin. 4
P-H WILLs ESTATES & TRUST SERVICE 15,301 (1954). Trusts seeking to qualify
for tax exemptions under the Internal Revenue Code are also subject to a list of
prohibited transactions, which may constitute restraints on investment. INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 401 (a).
52. By statute: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington and West Virginia. By court de-
cision: Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, Rhode Island and Vermont.
53. All states but Iowa, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Da-
kota, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Wyoming.
54. New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee and Wash-
ington.
55. United Garment Workers v. Jacob Reed's Sons, 83 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa.
1949).
56. Id. at 52.
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EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS AND STATUTORY REGULATION
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947
The impact of the LMRA upon employee benefit plans is threefold:
first, through its explicit provisions on health and pension funds;
second, through its broad code of collective bargaining; and third,
through its special provision for suits on labor agreements. In its
regulation of welfare trust funds, it seeks to assure joint employer-
employee control and to check fiscal abuses; in its more general regu-
lation, it deals with welfare plans as one of many subjects of collective
bargaining; and, in its provision for suits on union agreements, it
opens the federal courts as a special forum for redress of grievances.
WELFARE FUND REGULATION--SECTION 302
The starting point of LMRA regulation over employee benefit funds
is its prohibition of payments by an employer to representatives of
his employees. To avoid company unionism and union racketeering,
Congress made it unlawful for an employer to pay money or to give
anything of value to a representative of his employees or for a repre-
sentative to receive it from him. At the same time, exceptions were
provided for obviously benign purposes. One of these was a trust
fund for employee benefits. The statute requires that the money be
paid to a trust fund devoted to certain purposes and created under
specified formalities. 7 The trust fund must be: (1) for the sole and
exclusive benefit of employees, their families and dependents (of the
one employer or jointly with employees, families and dependents of
other emplojers making similar payments) ; and (2) for medical or
hospital care, pensions on retirement or death, compensation for in-
juries or illness resulting from occupational injury, or for insurance
on the foregoing, or for unemployment benefits, or for life, disability,
sickness or accident insurance. Employer payments intended for
employee pensions or annuities must be made to a separate trust not
to be used for any other purposes. 8 *
The requirement that the trust must be exclusively for "the benefit
of his employees" has been held not to call for the inclusion of all the
employees of an employer.5 9 It is recognized that a union may bar-
gain for and establish a plan merely for the employees in a collective
bargaining unit.
In regard to the purposes of the trust, a general designation of any
of the approved types of benefits appears to be sufficient. The fact
57. 61 STAT. 157 (1947) (§ 302(c) (5)), 29 t.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (1952).
58. Ibid.
59. Upholsterers' Int'l Union v. Leathercraft Furniture Co., 82 F. Supp. 570
(E.D. Pa. 1949).
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that an insurance company may return surplus premiums to the trus-
tees and that they might divert such funds to purposes foreign to the
parties' agreement does not invalidate the trust.60 The use of pension
trust funds for temporary loans to employees, with adequate security,
has been permitted as not inconsistent with the purpose of the trust.61
An agreement which authorizes trustees to determine the kind and
quantity of welfare and retirement benefits also has been upheld on a
finding that the plan adopted is reasonable, though tentative and sub-
ject to change at the trustees' will12
The LMRA requires further that the trust fund be established by a
written agreement."3 This must provide for: (1) the basis upon which
payments are to be made; (2) administration of the trust fund by
equal representatives of employers and employees, with such neutral
persons as may be mutually agreed upon; (3) arbitration of dead-
locks by an impartial umpire, or, if none can be agreed upon within
a reasonable time, by a United States district court; (4) an annual
audit of the trust fund, a statement of which shall be available for
inspection by interested persons at the principal office of the fund and
at such other places as may be designated.
The written instrument of trust is customarily separate and apart
from the collective bargaining agreement. A mere statement in a
union agreement to the effect that the employer would not abandon
or modify a pre-existing benefit and pension plan was held to import
incorporation by reference, and the two agreements were read to-
gether as one binding contract." An oral agreement by an employer
to make contributions under a plan established in writing by an em-
ployers' association of which he was not a member was also sufficient
to meet the need for a written trust agreement. 5
The prohibition of employer contributions to employee representa-
tives other than trustees equally representative of the employer and
his employees has not proved watertight. In the phonograph record-
ing industry, trustees designated by employers (with a right in the
United States Secretary of Labor to appoint successors) were held
acceptable even though union certification was made a prerequisite
to approval of services to be covered by the plan.G In St. Louis, a
corporate health institute which the union did not control was per-
mitted to receive employer contributions for medical and hospital
60. Id. at 575.
61. United Garment Workers v. Jacob Reed's Sons, 83 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa.
1949).
62. Van Horn v. Lewis, 79 F. Supp. 541 (D.C. 1948).
63. 61 STAT. 157 (1947)(Q 302(c) (5) (B)), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1952).
64. AFL v. Western Union Tel. Co., 179 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1950).
65. United Marine Div. v. Essex Transportation Co., 216 F.2d 410 (3d Cir.
1954).
66. Op. ATT'Y GEN., RELFASE OF DEP'T OF LABOR (Dec. 13, 1948).
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services to employees. ' In a recent case in which there were joint trus-
tees, but the employer trustees were selected by employers not in
privity with the defendant employer, the district court found com-
pliance with the LMRA and stated, "we think that when set up as a
board... these individuals are not acting as representatives of either
union or employers. They are trustees of a fund and have fiduciary
duties in connection therewith as do any other trustees."68 Since the
LMRA refers only to trust funds and requires equal representation,
Congress must have intended to regard the trustees as representative
of those who appointed them. The court would be on firmer ground
if it stated that the Act requires merely equal representation of labor
and management without direct or personal representation of all
participants in the p.n.
The LMRA expressly exempts from its terms welfare trust funds
established prior to January 1, 1946.69 Even though an employer did
not contribute to such a fund prior to 1946, he might do so later with
impunity.70
The welfare trust provisions of the LMRA, unlike the collective
bargaining provisions, are penal in nature; violation is a misdemeanor
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.71 But there has been
little effort to enforce those provisions. The National Labor Rela-
tions Board has rejected all responsibility for the enforcement of
that section of the Act. When asked to proceed against a violation of
another portion of Section 302 (requiring written authorization for
a dues checkoff), the Board declined to do so on the ground that the
legislative history of the Act, as well as its language, established
criminal prosecution and injunction at the request of the Attorney
General as the exclusive methods of enforcing that section. Congress,
it said, did not intend the newly created limitations in Section 302 to
have any impact on the older unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the
Board.7 2 The Board will deal with checkoffs, welfare trust funds or
any other industrial practice, regardless of whether it is mentioned in
Section 302, if the practice falls within the definitions of unfair
labor practices in the Act; but it will do so under the specific limita-
67. Rice-Stix Co. v. St. Louis Labor Health Institute, 15 CCH LAB. CAS. 1 64,727
(E.D. Mo. 1948).
68. United Marine Div. v. Essex Transportation Co., 216 F.2d 410, 412 (3d
Cir. 1954).
69. 61 STAT. 157 (1947)(§ 302(g)), 29 U.S.C. § 186(g) (1952); Upholsterers'
Int'l Union v. Leathercraft Furniture Co., 82 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1949); Van
Horn v. Lewis, 79 F. Supp. 541 (D.C. 1948).
70. Fur Dressers Union v. Fur Dressers Guild, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.
1949) ; In re Feller 196 Misc. 18, 82 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; In re Baker,
194 Misc. 51, 85 N.YS.2d 193 (Sup. Ct. 1948):
71. 61 STAT. 157 (1947) (§ 302(d) ), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (d) (1952).
72. Local 1664 (Dock Division), 103 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1953); New Orleans
Laundry, Inc., 100 N.L.R.B. 966 (1952); Crown Products Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 602
(1952); Salant & Salant, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 816 (1950).
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tions of other portions of the Act and not in enforcement of Section
302. Complaints concerning violations of the welfare trust provisions
of Section 302 are referred to the Attorney General.
For reasons unknown to the writer, the Attorney General has never
expressed a formal opinion with respect to the meaning or import of
Section 302 of the LMRA, nor have any rulings emanated from his
department concerning the penal provisions found in the statute.7 2
It seems reasonable to conclude that the penal provisions of the LMRA,
as the penal provisions of most labor laws, are distinguished by their
desuetude.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
It would be accurate to say that health and pension plans are
treated no differently from any other conditions of employment;
hence, the reader interested in knowing how the unfair labor practice
provisions of the LMRA apply to employee benefit plans would do well
to consult a comprehensive treatise on the decisions of the NLRB.
For the principles enunciated in all those decisions are applicable,
whenever pertinent, to situations involving employee benefit plans.
Space does not permit a r~sumd of all those principles in this article.
Yet the reader may desire, for ready reference, some mention of
NLRB rulings in cases that happen to involve employee benefit plans.
Such a presentation is attempted in the following paragraphs.
Employer's Refusal to Bargain-Section 8a(5). Now that approxi-
mately eleven million workers are covered in welfare plans with total
assets exceeding seventeen billion dollars, it seems a bit strange that
less than a decade ago it was seriously contended that welfare plans
were not a proper subject for collective bargaining. Although the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) clearly required bargaining
with respect to wages and other conditions of employment, many em-
ployers, who had established employee benefit plans unilaterally,
argued that Congress had not intended to compel them to submit
such plans to union negotiation. The NLRB, however, found that
"wages" must be construed to include emoluments of value like pen-
sion and insurance benefits, and there was no sound basis for exclud-
ing them from "other conditions of employment." A refusal to bar-
gain on pension and health plans was, therefore, an unfair labor
practice.74 The union's right to negotiate changes in a company
73. Letter dated December 27, 1954, from the Chief of the General Crimes
Section, United States Department of Justice. On another occasion, the writer
submitted an inquiry to the United States Attorney General in Washington and
to the United States Attorney in Los Angeles for an interpretation as to the
legality of making employers beneficiaries of a health and welfare plan along
with their employees; no reply was received from either official.
74. Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1 (1948), enforcement granted, 170 F.2d
247 (7th Cir. 1949); Black-Clawson Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 928 (1953); Anchor Rome
Mills, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 1120 (1949); Allied Mills, Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 854 (1949).
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initiated plan was recognized,- and once a union expressed an interest
in an established plan, the Board required the employer to consult the
union before modifying his plan.- Enforcement of one of the Board's
orders in such a case was denied by a district court which found that
subsequent bargaining without incorporating the plan in the union
agreement waived the union's right to be consulted on the abandon-
ment of a unilateral plan.7 When no plan was in existence and a
union indicated its desire to bargain on the subject, it was held that
an employer was not free to institute a welfare plan by unilateral
action.78
The complexity of bargaining on pension plans or other benefits has
not excused a refusal to bargain on them, 7 even when there were
several unions and different plans involved. s0 _
The duty to bargain has certain correlative obligations. One of
these is to negotiate in good faith at a time and place reasonably
convenient to both parties.8' Unilateral action by an employer while
negotiations were suspended has been regarded as a breach of good
faith. 8 2 If a welfare or pension plan had been the subject of collective
bargaining and an agreement were reached without including it, no
further negotiations would be required during the term of that con-
tract; but when there had been no previous discussion of the subject,
the union could insist upon bargaining on it within the term of an
existing union agreement.8 3 On the other hand, an employer's refusal
to incorporate a reopening clause permitting renegotiation of a pen-
sion plan in the middle of a contract term was held to be justified on
the basis that the inherent nature of pension plans required long range
planning8
Another corollary of the duty to bargain is the obligation to furnish
data required for intelligent bargaining. Refusal to supply pension
and other welfare data requested by a union has been held to show
75. W.W. Cross & Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1948), enforcement granted, 174 F.2d
875 (Ist Cir. 1949).
76. Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1 (1948), aff'd, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1949).
See Administrative Decisions, NLRB GEN. COUNSEL, Case No. 451 (Nov. 14,
1952) (unpublished).
77. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 211 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1954), denying enforce-
ment, 103 N.L.R.B. 1695 (1953). Also, a unilateral change in the insurance com-pany underwriting a plan which does not affect the benefits has been approvedby the General Counsel of the Board. Administrative Decisions, NLRB GEN.
COUNSEL, Case No. 404 (Oct. 10, 1952) (unpublished).
78. General Motors Corp., 81 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949).
79. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949).
80. Phelps Dodge Corp., 15 N.L.R.B. 732 (1939).
81. 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952).82. W.W. Cross & Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1948), enforcement granted, 174
F.2d 875 (Ist Cir. 1949); Square D Company, 105 N.L.R.B. 253 (1953).
83. Jacobs Manufacturing Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enforcement granted,
196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
84. National Carbon Division, Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. & National
Carbon Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 689 (1952).
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bad faith in bargaining.65 The requirement to furnish relevant data
may be waived by the union, but such a waiver must be quite clear."
A contract provision recognizing "retirement of employees" as an
exclusive function of management was held too indefinite to constitute
a waiver of a union's right to open negotiations on a pension plan,
because the contract may have referred only to the time of retirement
and not to retirement benefits.87
If an employer bargains in good faith, he need not consent to any
benefit plan. He must "hold himself open to persuasion"; but he
need not submit to marathon discussion, and, after "reasoned dis-
cussion," he may refuse to accede to any specific terms.8  An em-
ployer who refused for valid economic reasons to entertain proposals
for pension adjustments was held justified in putting the same changes
into effect a year later when economic conditions had changed8 9 If,
in the course of bargaining with several unions, one union rejected a
plan acceptable to the others, the Board's general counsel has ruled
that the employer may proceed with that plan even for employees
represented by the recalcitrant union.9
An employer has been required to bargain with a new union over a
plan established with a predecessor union ;i and, even when a pur-
chaser of a business has not assumed the union contracts negotiated
by his seller, the purchaser has been held duty bound to bargain on
a welfare plan in his own behalf.92
Employer's Unfair Discrimination- Section 8a(3). The LMRA
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in
hire, discharge, or terms of employment for or against union mem-
bership. A pension or welfare plan with greater or lesser benefits for
union members, as distinct from nonunion employees, poses the issue
of such discrimination, and the Board has accordingly ruled that such
cases involve unfair labor practices. 93 In one case, even though the
85. Jacobs Manufacturing Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enforcement granted,
196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952); Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 485 (7th Cir.
1942); Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952); Reed &
Prince Manufacturing Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951).
86. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 211 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1954); Standard Oil Co.,
92 N.L.R.B. 227 (1950); Administrative Decisions, NLRB GEN. COUNSEL, Case
No. 793 (Sept. 11, 1953) (unpublished).
87. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949).
88. Administrative Decisions, NLRB GEN. COUNSEL, Case No. 451 (Nov. 14,
1952) (unpublished); see Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 101 N.LR.B. 360,
366 (1952).
89. National Carbon Division, Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. & National
Carbon Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 689 (1952).
90. Administrative Decisions, NLRB GEN. COUNSEL, Case No. 819 (Oct. 9,
1958) (unpublished).
91. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952).
92. NLRB v. Hoppes Mfg. Co., 170 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1948); Stonewall Cotton
Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 325 (1948).
93. Bedding & Drapery Workers Union, 34 L.R.R.M. 1332 (1954); Jandel Furs,
100 N.L.R.B. 1390 (1952); Rockaway News Supply Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1056 (1951).
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parties abandoned their original closed shop agreement pending
NLRB proceedings and negotiated a new plan not limited to union
members, the Board found the parties guilty of an unfair labor prac-
tice." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB,95 upheld a Board order against
a plan that discriminated to the disadvantage of union members.
The District Court for the District of Columbia, however, in a case not
involving a Board order, ruled that a plan resulting in benefits only
to union members was not in violation of the LMRA. 6 The court
noted that "this agreement was not made between the operators and
the employees. It was made between the operators and the United
Mine Workers of America, which is a very different proposition."T
Apparently the court was of the opinion that a union is not required
to provide for nonunion members in the absence of an express provi-
sion against them.
Theoretically, two separate but equal plans for union and non-
union employees will not violate the Act; but a separate plan for
nonunion employees which stated it was for employees who did not
become union members was held to suggest a continuation of non-
membership and, therefore, interfered with the exercise of the em-
ployee's free choice of membership."'
Differences among employers, and the economics of insurance, make
some differentiation among classes of employees unavoidable. Dis-
crimination based on craft, class, seniority, merit rating, pay scale
or disability has been declared legitimate provided it is not in reality
a subterfuge for discrimination involving union affiliation."
The issue of discrimination in the administration of a valid pension
plan was posed by the re-employment of strikers and non-strikers, all
of whom had been out of work during a nine-week strike. The em-
ployer allowed credit for continuous service toward pension benefits
to the non-strikers and denied it to the strikers. The Board reasoned
that pensions were equivalent to wages; that the employer could not
be required to pay wages to economic strikers; that he was privileged
to pay non-strikers stand-by pay;'hence, that there was no unfair
labor practice in the discriminatory allowance of pension time
credit.200
94. Jandel Furs, 100 N.L.R.B. 1390 (1952).
95. 107 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1939).
96. Van Horn v. Lewis, 79 F. Supp. 541 (D.C. 1948).
97. Id. at 543.
98. Interstate Motor Freight Systems, Inc., NLRB Case No. 14-CA-830 (trial
examiner's intermediate report, Dec. 10, 1952).
99. Administrative Decisions, NLRB GEN. COUNSEL, Case No. 356, 30 L.R.R.M.
1319 (1952). See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§.401(a) (4), 501(a) (A trusteed pen-
sion plan created by an employer for the exclusive benefit of his employees does
not qualify for tax exemption if the benefits of the plan discriminate in favor of
officers, supervisors, stockholders, or highly paid employees.).
100. General Electric Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 510 (1948).
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Company Unionism-Section Sa(2). Since private welfare plans
had been offered for years as a substitute for unionism, it was to be
expected that the ban upon company unions, introduced by the
NLRA, 201 would disturb some existing health and pension plans. In
the Kresge Department Store case, 02 a workers' mutual aid associa-
tion had functioned for 44 years prior to the enactment of the NLRA.
Upon enactment of the NLRA it became a "labor organization" sub-
ject to the Act and some steps were taken to divorce it from manage-
ment. Nevertheless, company executives continued to hold office in
the association and the employer gave space, rent-free, for a medical
department, paid the salaries of medical and nursing personnel and
gave the association a monetary gift. The Board found that company
"interference" remained active, and ordered the association dises-
tablished. At the same time, the Board noted that nothing in its order
should be taken to require the company to vary or abandon the sub-
stantive features of any existing contract relative to rates of pay or
other conditions of employment.103 The practical effect of that ruling
would appear to be that a welfare plan might be kept intact even.
though a company-dominated labor organization is ordered dissolved.
Employer's Restraint of Employees in the Exercise of Their Rights
-Section 8a(1). It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to
restr in, coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of their rights
under Section 7 of the Act which primarily consists of the right to
join a union and to bargain collectively or to refrain from doing so.
Most of the conduct constituting the unfair labor practices of refusal
to bargain and antiunion or prounion discrimination are also unfair
labor practices of restraint or coercion; therefore, the same conduct
generally involves unfair labor practices under two sections of the
Act
Certain conduct of employers has been found unfair particularly
as a restraint or coercion of employees in their choice or rejection
of a labor organization. Any threat of reprisal or promise of a benefit
by an employer to influence the action of employees in the course of
a union organization campaign or in a representation election is such
an unfair labor practice. The use of threats or promises in connection
with health and pension plans may be such an unfair labor practice
depending upon the circumstances surrounding the employer's state-
ment.
An employer's announcement threatening to discontinue medical
services if a union were successful in a forthcoming election was held
a clear violation of the Act.10' So was a statement to the effect that
101. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(2) (1941).
102. 77 N.L.R.B. 212 (1948).
108. Id. at 217.
104. Burns Brick Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 389 (1948).
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if workers organized they would lose life insurance and health and
accident policies carried by the employer.10 5 In a case in which a
hospitalization plan had been under consideration for some time, the
employer's announcement of the plan in the week immediately pre-
ceding an election was found to be calculated to coerce the decision
of the employees.4°6 On the other hand, a pre-election listing of bene-
fits given by an employer in the past, including pension and insurance
plans, was held to involve no threat of retraction, and, hence, no
unfair labor practice .20
Union's Unfair Labor Practices -Section 8b(1)(2)(3). The
acts of labor organizations, proscribed by the LMRA, may involve
employee benefit plans very much in the same manner as the unfair
labor practices of employers. A union was held in violation of the
Act jointly with an. employer for a closed shop agreement restricting
pension benefits to union members.208 A union, however, may be
guilty alone of restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of
their right to refraih-from joining a union. Such was indicated in
a case in which a welfare fund agreement did not contain any dis-
criminatory clauses, but the union sought to deprive certain members
of their benefits after they had been declared not in good standing.1
It is also an unfair labor practice on the- part of the union for it to
induce an employer to discriminate against nonunion employees. A
union's insistence, in-the course of collective bargaining, upon a wel-
fare and retirement fund for union members only was held such
coercion of employer discrimination. 110
A union has the right to adopt rules of conduct for its members
and such rules are exempt from the prohibition against restraint or
coercion upon employees by a union. 1 In a situation in which ex-
pulsion from a union might have resulted in the loss of a job and
other economic benefits, such as a pension, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided that the threat of expulsion
for infraction of union rules was not a violation of the LMRA.11
The court found that coercion by.a labor organization was illegal
only to the extent declared by Congress and that Congress made
illegal only such action as would "not impair the right of a labor
105. Hazen & Jaeger Funeral Home 95 N L RB. 1034 (1951).
106. Lake Superior District Power Zo., 88 N.L.R.B. 1496 (1950); Agar Packing
& Provision Corp., 81 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1949); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 81
N.L.R.B. 557 (1949).
107. L.H. Butcher Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 1184 (1949).
108. Jandel Furs, 100 N.L.R.B 189D (1952).
109. See Bedding & Drapery Workers Union, 34 L.R.R.M. 1332, 1334 (1954).
110. Penello v. International Union, UMW 88 F. Supp. 935 (D.C. 1950).
111. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1)A (1952).
112. American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir.
1951); ef. Bedding & Drapery Workers Union, 34 L.R.R.M. 1332 (1954) (expul-
sion for refusal to sign a checkoff authorization).
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organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition
or retention of membership ... ,,Ill
No decisions have been found involving employee benefit plans in
the unfair labor practices of secondary boycotts and sympathetic
strikes, but such cases may arise.
REPRESENTATION PROBLEMS-SECTION 9
Welfare plans have posed a few problems in the determination of
the proper representatives of employees for the purposes of collective
bargaining. Again, no comprehensive treatment of the subject will be
attempted in this article, but those cases involving such plans shall
be noted.
Unit Appropriate for Collective Bargaining. The certification of a
labor organization as a proper bargaining agent rests upon the choice
made by employees within a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining. The delineation of the appropriate unit, or the
designation of which employees shall be included within it and which
are to be excluded from it, is determined by a multitude of factors
such as the mutuality of interests among the workers, the history of
union affiliation, past bargaining practices, prior employer affiliations
and customary craft and industrial alignments.
Retired employees used only occasionally have been excluded from
an appropriate unit because they had no substantial interest in shop
working conditions.?1" Thus, pensioners subject to recall have been
excluded from a production and maintenance unit." 5 In one case,
although pensioners were bargained for informally, they were ex-
cluded from a voting group because of a lack of community of interest
with employees in active service and their status as employees under
the Act was said to be in doubt-" 6
Contractual Bars to Elections. In order to promote collective bar-
gaining as enjoined by Congress, the Board has ruled that existing
contracts between proper employee representatives and employers
may not be upset by new negotiations until the existing contracts have
run their terms or have been undisturbed for a- reasonable length of
time. Such contracts are a bar to demands for new negotiations or
for new representation elections. In plants or industries having em-
ployee benefit plans, the problem may be compounded by the existence
of different terms for the collective bargaining agreement and the
welfare or pension agreement. The Board has held uniformly that
when a pension plan has extended beyond the term of a union agree-
113. American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, supra note 112 at 800.
114. Whiting Corp. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1952); Jasper Wood
Products Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 333 (1946).
115. Wisconsin Power & Light Co 67 N.L.R.B. 1219 (1946); W.D. Byron &
Sons of Md., Inc., 55 N.L.R.B. 172 (194).
116. Public Service Corp. of N.J., 72 N.L.R.B. 224 (1947).
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ment, it has not been a bar to a petition for an election by a rival
union at the time the union agreement expired."1'
Interference with Elections. Elections may be invalidated by ir-
regularities that render a free choice impossible or extremely doubt-
ful. Employer statements containing threats of reprisal or promises
of benefits on the eve of an election have been considered above as
unfair labor practices;"" but such conduct would also be grounds for
challenging the result of the election.'" In an internal union struggle,
a group of officers shifted their allegiance to a new union, seized the
sick benefit funds and allowed claims of only those employees who
signed up with the new organization. This was held to invalidate an
election in which both old and new unions were placed on the ballot.12 0
ENFORCEMENT POWERS'OF THE NLRB
In unfair labor practice and representation cases involving health
and pension plans, the. NLRB has exercised its usual powers. Orders
have been issued directing respondents to cease and desist unfair
practices, to engage affirnatively in conduct required to effectuate
the purposes of the Act and to post the usual notices of intent to
comply. The Board once had occasion to order an employer to rein-
state- dismissed employees with back pay and to pay insurance to the
representatives of one employee who had died and had been deprived
of an employee benefit.211 Though that decision was reversed as to the
deceased employee on other grounds, there is no reason to doubt that
in an appropriate case, an order to pay benefits necessary to restore
a wrongfully discharged employee to his former status would be
enforced. Back pay should reasonably include retroactive contribu-
tions to a benefit plan.
The refusal of the Board to engage itself with the enforcement of
Section 302 has been noted above.1 22 . In another situation also the
Board has refused to deal with problems arising out of a welfare fund.
A change in union affiliation was followed by a dispute over credits
built up in a fund of the original union. The Board refused to ad-
judicate the conflict over property rights; stating that such questions
were not controlled by the LMRA and were to be decided by a court 12 '
117. Gates Rubber Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 351 (1951); Independence Lumber & Mfg.
Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1353 (1951) ; Aluminum Co. of America, 80 N.L.R.B. 1342 (1948).
By Section 9(c) (3) of the LIRA, an election cannot be held in any unit m
which a valid election has taken place within twelve months.
118. See text at note 104 et seq. supra.
119. See notes 104-106 supra.
120. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. NLRB, 210 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1954).
121. NLRB v. Glen Raven Silk Mills, Inc., 203 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1953).
122. See pp. 128, 129 et seq. supra. -
123. Boston Mfachine Works Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 59 (1950).
Washington University Open Scholarship
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
SUITS BY OR AGAINST UNIONS-SECTION 301
The LMRA makes provision for federal court remedies going be-
yond matters involving the NLRB, and such remedies are available
in disputes arising out of employee benefit plans. Section 301 of the
Act provides that suits for violation of contracts between an em-
ployer and a labor organization in an industry affecting interstate
commerce may be brought in any district court of the United States,
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in.
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Under this section of the LMRA, suits have been allowed to compel
an employer to contribute to a sickness and accident fund,12' to obtain
pension benefits under a plan incorporated in the union agreement
only by reference,1 5 to avoid involuntary retirement,126 and to deter-
mine the exemption of old trust funds from the LMRA.'2
In all of these instances, the actions were brought also for declara-
tory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act ;128 but there is no
reason why suits may not be founded upon Section 301 of the LMRA
alone.
In a Ford Motor Company case, suit was filed jointly by the union
and the aggrieved employee. The parties plaintiff complained that an
involuntary retirement at age 65 was in violation of a union agree-
ment that permitted discharge only for just cause. The court indi-
cated that under Section 301 the employee was not a proper party;
however, since he had a good cause of action for breach of contract
under state laws, and since he did allege diversity of citizenship and
the proper jurisdictional amount, he was privileged to join with the
union in this federal action. 12 ' In the same case, the court recognized
that suit under Section 301 subjected prayers for injunctive relief to
the requirements of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 30 The court also
declared that when a union agreement details a grievance procedure
it must be exhausted before suit is filed, unless, as in this instance,
the employer made such a course futile by insisting that the matter
in dispute was not subject to the union agreement and by denying
the union's request to follow the grievance procedure. 3 1
124. Upholsterers' Int'l Union v. Leathercraft Furniture Co., 82 F. Supp. 570
(E.D. Pa. 1949).
125. AFL v. Western Union Tel. Co., 179 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1950).
126. United Protective Workers of America v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997
(7th Cir. 1952) ; Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Intl Union v. National Biscuit
Co., 78 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
127. Fur Dressers Union v. Fur Dressers Guild, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.
N.Y. 1949).
128. 62 STAT. 964 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1952).
129. United Protective Workers of America v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997
(7th Cir. 1952).
130. Id. at 1001.
131. id- at 1001, 1002.
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There remains as yet unsettled the very important question of the
extent to which the LMRA has preempted the field of labor relations
and has placed problems of employee benefit plans exclusively within
federal jurisdiction. The relevant cases do not involve welfare
plans ;232 it is quite likely, however, that Supreme Court decisions in
recent and pending cases may determine that certain disputes involv-
ing employee benefit plans of employers engaged in activities affecting
interstate commerce shall fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB and the federal courts.2 3
FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE LAWS
In so far as contributions to, and payments from, employee benefit
plans may be considered wages, it is important to consider their
status under the federal minimum wage laws.
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers en-
gaged in interstate commerce or in activities affecting interstate
commerce to pay a specified minimum wage,134 and, for all hours over
40 in any week, to pay time and a half the "regular rate" of pay. 13
The Walsh-Healey Act requires all persons who contract with the
federal government to manufacture or furnish materials, supplies,
articles or equipment in an amount exceeding $10,000 to pay prevail-
ing minimum wages as determined by the Secretary of Labor.' 36 Work
beyond eight hours a day or forty hours per week may be done only by
permission of the Secretary and on the payment of one and one-half
times "the basic hourly rate" of pay.13.
Employer contributions and benefit payments under welfare plans
are not regarded as part of the minimum wages required by those
laws. The FLSA expressly provides that:
[T] he "regular rate" . . shall not be deemed to include
contributions irrevocably made by an employer to a trustee or
third person pursuant to a bona fide plan for providing old-age,
retirement, life, accident or health insurance or similar benefits
for employees.13 8
The same principle has been applied to the Walsh-Healey Act by regu-
lation.
132. United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S.
656' (1954) ; Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) ; Plankinton Packing
Co. v. Wis. Emp. Rel. Board, 338 U.S. 953 (1950); Richman Bros. Co. v. Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers, 114 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
133. Ibid.
134. 52 STAT. 1062 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1952).
135. 52 STAT. 1063 (198), 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1952).
136. 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), as amended, 54 -STAT. 681 (1940), 41 U.S.C. § 40
(1952).
137. 49 STAT. 2038, 2039 (1936), as amended, 54 STAT. 681 (1940), 41 U.S.C.§ 40 (1952).
138. 63 STAT. 913, 914 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 207(d) (4) (1952).
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The Wage-Hour Administrator, who functions for the Secretary
of Labor under the FLSA and the Walsh-Healey Act, has issued a
set of standards for determining when a plan comes within the above
terms of the FLSA. The same standards are applied to ascertain
whether contributions or payments under a plan are to be excluded
from the computation of "the regular rate of pay," or "the basic
hourly rate." These criteria are as follows:
1. A specific plan must be adopted by an employer or by a collective
bargaining contract. Employees must have notice of it. It may be
employer financed or contributory.
2. The plan must provide death, disability, advanced age or retire-
ment benefits, or sick benefits, medical expenses, hospitalization and
the like.
3. The plan must set out one of the following:
a) Benefits that are specified or definitely determinable on an
actuarial basis.
b) A definite formula for determining employer contributions.
and the benefits of each participating employee.
c) Such a formula by a method consistent with the purposes of
the plan under the statute.
4. Employer contributions must go irrevocably to a trustee or a
third person pursuant to an insurance agreement, trust or other
funded arrangement. The trustee must assume the usual fiduciary
responsibilities imposed by law on trustees. There must be no recap-
ture or diversion of funds by an employer, but he may receive return
of the excess paid in error or by reason of an overestimation of costs.
There must be no employee contributions that cut beneath the min-
imum wage, unless paid to a third person or to a trustee not affiliated
with the employer.-
"KICKBACK" OR COPELAND ACT
Coiigress has made it a misdemeanor for anyone to induce an em-
ployee engaged in the construction or repair of a public building, or
engaged in any public work (or work financed in whole or in part by
loan or grant from the United States), to give up any part of the
compensation to which he is entitled under his contract of employ-
ment. This may not be done by force, intimidation, threat of dis-
missal or by any manner whatsoeverU0
The Secretary of Labor is empowered to make reasonable regula-
tions under the Copeland Act, and he has interpreted the Act as not
prohibiting
139. 29 CoDE FED. REQs. § 778.6(g) (Cum. Supp. 1953) (overtime compensa-
tion).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 874 (1952).
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[t]he payment of dues or premiums to unafliliated insurance
companies or associations for medical or hospitalization insurance
where the employer is not required by federal, state or local laws
to supply such insurance or benefits.241
The Secretary has also indicated that upon application, he will
give written permission for the deduction of contributions to a pen-
sion fund, if the employee voluntarily consents in writing or if the
plan is provided for in a union contract.
STATE WAGE DEDUCTION AND ASSIGNMENT LAWS
To permit employers to transmit employee contributions directly
to welfare trustees or insurance companies, as part of wage payment,
it is necessary to comply with state laws on wage deductions and as-
signments.
Approximately one third of the states require a written authoriza-
tion signed by the employee before wages may be withheld and paid
to a third party.14 2 A few require that a written statement of the
total amount of deductions must be given the employee.1 43 Michigan
and New Jersey laws state that the authorization must be voluntarily
agreed to, " and Indiana makes it revocable at any time.1 4  Mis-
souri limits the effect of an assignment to wages earned at the time
of assignment.146 In New York, no individual assignment is needed
if a union agreement provides for the wage deduction, '4 and in
West Virginia, such agreements are exempted from the wage assign-
ment law. 8
AGE DISCRIMINATION LAWS
Pension plans may run counter to state laws prohibiting discrimi-
nation in hiring, firing or terms of employment on the basis of age.
Massachusetts has made void all contracts which tend to prevent
employment of persons between the ages of 45 and 65,149 and its Fair
141. 29 CODE FED. REcs. § 3.5(e)(4) (1949) (payroll deductions under the
Anti-Kickback Regulations).
142. CAr. LABOR CODE ANN. § 224 (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 48, § 39.1 (1950);
IND. STAT. ANN. § 40-210 (Burns 1952); IOWA CODE ANN. c. 539, § 539.4 (1950);
KY. Rlv. STAT. § 371.110(1) (1953); MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 154, § 2 (1948)
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.04 (West 1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 36-213 (1952);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-12. (1953) (notarized and'recorded); N.Y. PERs. OP.
LAW § 46-c (unless authorized by union agreement-see annotations to section);
R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 292, § 1 (1938).
143. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 701 (1953); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.271 (1950)
(common carriers); ORE. REV. STAT. § 652.610 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-10-4
(1953); VA. CODE § 40-25 (1950) (certain industries).
144. DlicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.585 (1954); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-33 (1950)
(majority approval of the plan authorizes deductions by the employer).
145. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-214 (Burns 1952).
146. Mo. RFv. STAT. § 432.030 (1949).
147. N.Y. WOR N'S COMP. LAW § 209. See Section 205 for a list of per-
missible deductions.
148. W. VA. CODE § 2352 (1949).
149. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 149, § 24A (1950).
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Employment Practices Act was amended to make all discrimination
because of age unlawful. Under that Act, the Massachusetts Com-
mission against Discrimination has ruled that involuntary retirement
by virtue of a pension plan was void. °50 Colorado has banned dis-
charge for age at any time between the ages of 18 and 60.151 In
Louisiana, it is unlawful for an employer of 25 or more persons to
discharge an employee upon any age limit under 50 years except where
an old age pension system is adopted.25 2
VETERAN'S RE-EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
The U. S. Department of Labor has published a handbook on the
re-employment rights of veterans under the Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act.153 In commenting on the right of veterans to be
reinstated without loss of rights, the Department stated:
The extent to which insurance and pension benefits are part of
job status varies with the employer's personnel practices or cus-
tom or collective bargaining agreement in effect which grants
such advantages to other employees. Where a veteran enjoyed
those benefits before entering service, and to the extent that they
are dependent upon security, the veteran should not be deprived
of them because of military service.15'
If benefits depend on contributions of both employer and employee,
neither is required to continue his contributions during the service.
The full period of military service, however, is counted as employment
in computing seniority for a pension or insurance.55
SOCIAL SECURITY ACTS
Social Security Acts have presented several problems of possible
overlapping or conflict with private benefit plans. The practical ques-
tion has been whether one type of benefits must be added to or sub-
tracted from the other type. Because of the diversity of statutes and
private agreements, that question can be answered only in terms of a
specific statute and a particular employee benefit plan.
Old Age and Survivors Insurance. The federal OASI program
makes no reference to private pension or other benefit plans.256 Em-
150. Memo of Position, MASS. CoM'N AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (Oct. 1952).
151. COLO. STAT. ANN. § 80-4-16 (1953).
152. An employer may adopt rules for the discharge of employees under fifty
years of age where he has
adopted a system of old age pension for the pensioning of employees with
periods of service no greater than thirty-five years and with pension allow-
ances of no less than forty-five dollars per. quarter.
LA. REV. STAT. § 23:893 (1950).
153. 65 STAT. 85 (1951), 50 U.S.C. App. § 459 (1952).
154. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, SOLICITOR OF LABOR, INTERPRETIVE BULLETIN AND
LEGAL GUIDE; VETERANS' REE.-PLOYMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE SELECTIVE TRAINING
& SERvica ACT OF 1940 (1948).
155. Ibid.
156. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-419 (1952); P-H Soc. SEn. TAX SERv. 1 31,060 (1954).
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ployer and employee contributions to the federal plan are taxes that
must be paid regardless of private plans. Annuity payments are paid
under the federal law even to persons receiving private pensions; but
the federal payments are withheld if a person earns more than $1200
per year in other employment. Private employee benefit plans, how-
ever, may provide for full benefits, or reduced benefits, under their
schemes for recipients of a federal pension.
Unemployment Compensation. The state UC laws require contribu-
tions in all cases regardless of private benefit plans, 5T There again,
payment is a matter of taxes-tied to both federal and state laws.
In providing for unemployment benefits, the state laws differ consid-
erably. A large group of states have adopted the rule by administra-
tive decision that an unemployed worker is not to be disqualified for
any portion of the state compensation because he is receiving benefits
under a private pension plan.158 The general rule that an unemployed
worker must be ready, able and willing to accept new employment,
however, disqualifies-many retired employees. 59
Many states reduce the state payment by the amount of the private
pension, eslecially if the employee benefit plan is financed substanti-
ally by the employer.260 In respect to benefits paid for sickness, ac-
cident or other disability, only a few states deduct the amount of such
receipts from state unemployment compensation.1 1
Private pension plans contemplate the retirement of a worker, and
ordinarily take no cognizance of any new employment or unemploy-
ment that may follow. Conceivably, the private plan might take that
into account. Other benefit plans are.similarly geared to events or
disabilities that do not call for consideration of unemployment bene-
fits. If a private unemployment compensation scheme were estab-
157. 1A CCH UNEMIPL. INS. REP. f 2300 (1950). Three of the four states
which have state disability benefit plans do, however, provide for private as well
as state operated plans. See text at notes 163-166 infra.
158. California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming. CCH PENS.
PLAN GUIDE 2303 (1954) ; P-H SOC. SEC. TAX SEav. § 27,826 (1954).
159. California, Illinois, New Jersey and New York have rulings to the effect
that voluntary retirement under a pension plan disqualifies a person by taking
him out of the labor market; Virginia and Wyoming have rulings that there is a
rebuttable presumption to the same effect; and Pennsylvania and Kentucky have
made the receipt of unemployment compensation contingent upon willingness to
take jobs involving the relinquishment ofprivate pension rights. CCH PENS.
PLXN GUIDE 2303 (1954); P-H Soc. SEC. TAx SERV. § 27,826 (1954).
160. Alabama, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, West Virginia and Wisconsin
require such an offset; Arkansas grounds eligibility for state compensation on
the nonreceipt of any private pension payments. All but the first three states
mentioned and Nebraska, however, require reduction only in the case of plans
controlled and/or financed, in whole or in part, by the employer. CCH PENS. PLAN
GUIDE 2303 (1954) ; P-H Soc. SEC. TAX SERe. % 27,826 (1954).
161. Arkansas, New Hampshire and South Dakota. P-H Soc. SEc. TAX SERV.
27,826 (1954).
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lished-as a guaranteed annual wage plan or plans of a similar nature
-it could make any provision the parties wished with respect to the
subtraction or supplementation of state unemployment benefits.
Old Age Assistance. The state laws for aid to the aged'and the
handicapped (with matching federal grants) are ordinarily based
on a proof of need.162 Whether the receipt of benefits under a private
employee benefit plan would eliminate need depends upon the circum-
stances of the recipient and the amounts involved.
Sickness and Accident Disability. Only four states have laws pro-
viding compensation for sickness and accident disability. Rhode
Island has a compulsory public plan, not affected by private plans.' 63
New York requires employers to institute private plans which meet
certain standards; additional benefit plans are permitted, but as long
as the employee receives the statutory minimum payment in the event
of disability, other private benefits may be reduced or maintained.1"
California and New Jersey have public disability insurance plans
with optional provisions allowing employers to substitute private
plans maintaining specified standards. New Jersey permits the re-
duction of the temporary disability payments: to the extent that the'
employer makes pension or permanent disability payments.165 Cali-
fornia permits the deduction of wages paid from the disability bene-
fits.1 "
Private sickness and accident benefit plans (other than those de-
signed to substitute for state disability insurance) may provide for
either a diminution of private benefits upon the receipt of public
benefits or for full private benefits in addition to public benefits.
BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION
The effect of the Bankruptcy Act167 upon the rights of parties under
employee benefit plans has been clarified in several decisions.
Benefit plan trustees sought to establish a preference for the re-
covery of overdue contributions from the estate of a bankrupt em-
ployer in two different situations. In the first, the claim to a prefer-
ence was based on the theory of a constructive trust. The United
States Supreme Court said that the employer was not expected to ac-
cumulate a separate fund, that there had been no transfer or ear-
162. IA CCH UNEMPL. INS. REP. 2240 (1952).
163. R.I. GEm. LAWS c. 1200 (1942).
164. N.Y. WORKMEN'S CoMP. LAw § 211 (Disability Benefits Law). See Section
205 for a list of permissible deductions.
165. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-30 (1950); P-H SOC. SEc. TAX SRav. 28,826(1954).
166. CAL. UNEMP'. INS. CODEu ANN. § 2656 (1953). Some private benefit plan
payments have been hd to be "wages" under this act. 2 CCH UNmtPL INS. REP.
2630 (1954).
167. 62 STAT. 874 (1938), as amended, 66 STAT. 426 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 104
(1952).
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marking of funds, and that there remained only a debtor-creditor
relation between the employer and his employees or between the
employer and the welfare association. On the basis of the foregoing,
the Court declined to recognize a constructive trust or a preference.",5
In the second situation, time for a wage preference had not elapsed
and priority was claimed on that ground. The plan called for both
employer and employee contributions, and a federal district court
agreed with the welfare trustees' contention that both contributions
were in the nature of wages.2'
An employee's interest in a benefit fund and the effect of a spend-
thrift clause were also considered in a bankruptcy proceeding. The
benefit plan was a contributory pension scheme and the agreement
prohibited any assignment or anticipation of the employee's interest
in the fund. The employee became bankrupt and his creditors de-
sired to receive his accumulated interest in the fund. The court held
that the fund did not create a savings account for the employee and
that the non-assignriment clause was not contrary to law; hence, at
the time of bankruptcy there was no asset that could be transferred
to the trustee in bankruptcy or to the bankrupt's creditors.bo
The responsibilities of trustees in a reorganization proceeding
under the Bankruptcy Act were detailed on a few occasions. In the
reorganization of a Puerto Rican railway the trustees were required
to honor pension claims'71 and were later ordered to pay benefits for
the lives of the annuitants rather than to the date of the final decree
in the reorganization proceeding.?? In another railway reorganiza-
tion, the trustee was directed to pay pensions as part of his operating
expenses even though he had not assumed the collective bargaining
contract establishing the pension plan.2'7
TAX LAWS
FEDERAL TAx LAWS
In the preparation of health and welfare plans, special tax exemp-
tions can be obtained if advantage is taken of certain sections of the
Internal Revenue Code. The tax law differentiates annuities and
accident and health payments under ordinary individual insurance
policies from those under employer-employee plans. Greater exemp-
tions are allowed for the latter if they meet certain criteria.
168. McKee v. Paradise, 299 U.S. 119 (1936).
169. In re Schmidt, 24 CCH LAB. CAS. 68,012 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
170. In re Baxter, 104 F.2d 318 (6th Cir. 1939).
171. Vallejo v. American R.R., 188 F.2d 513 (1st Cir. 1951).
172. American R.R. v. Vallejo, 202 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1953).
173. In re Schenectady Ry., 93 F. Supp. 67 (N.D. N.Y. 1950). Employees not
covered by the collective bargaining agreement were said to be getting a gratuitous
annuity and the trustee was allowed to discontinue payments to them. Id. at 70.
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To qualify for special tax exemptions, an employees' pension plan
must meet the following standards :174
1. All contributions must be made to a trust for the purpose of
distributing funds (and income) for the exclusive benefit of em-
ployees or their beneficiaries.
2. The plan must benefit a certain number of employees-either
(a) 70% or more of all the employees or if 70% are eligible, it must
benefit 80% or more of those eligible (excluding employees of less
than five years employment, part time employees and seasonal em-
ployees) ; or (b) a classification of employees found.by the Secretary
of the Treasury not to be discriminatory.
3. The plan must not be discriminatory in favor of officers, share-
holders, supervisors and highly paid employees.
A plan will not be considered discriminatory merely because (a) it
excludes employees who receive only wages, (b) it is limited to
salaried or clerical employees, (c) its contributions or benefits bear
a uniform relationship to total compensation or rate of pay, (d) its
contributions or benefits based on wages differ from contributions or
benefits based on other remuneration, or (e) its contributions or'
benefits differ because of state or federal retirement benefits.
An advance ruling on whether a plan qualifies under the Internal
Revenue Code may be obtained from the District Director of Internal
Revenue.""
Such a qualified trust plan confers these principal benefits:
1. The trust pays no tax on its income from qualified investments.176
2. The employer, in computing his gross income for income tax pur-
poses, may deduct his contributions to the plan within prescribed
limit&,
3. The employee pays no income tax on the contributions made in
his behalf by his employer.
174. INT. Rnv. CODE of 1954, § 401(a). The United Mine Workers Welfare and
Retirement Fund was denied tax exemption in 1953 because contributions were
not earmarked for pensions alone. Section 404(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 makes a special dispensation for this fund. In addition to statutory stand-
ards, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has required an intent to have a
Dermanent plan, not just one designated to siphon off earnings in a prosperousyear.
175. Rev. Rul. 32, 1 CuM. BuLL 265 (1953).
176. Prohibited transactions are those in which the trust (a) lends money
without receiving adequate security, (b) pays unreasonable compensation for
services, (c) makes its services available on a preferential basis, (d) buys securi-
ties for more than their worth, (e) sells its property for less than its worth, or
(f) substantially diverts its funds or income to a creator of the trust, to a sub-
stantial contributor to the trust, or to a member of the family of either or to
a corporation at least half controlled by such person. INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
1 503 (c).
177. An employer may deduct up to 5% of each employee's compensation
(actual cost if employer is a corporation) and may carry forward larger payment
for deduction in a later year if his contribution then is less than the allowable
amount. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 404.
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4. The employee pays an income tax only on the benefits he re-
ceives,-and then, if he has contributed to the fund, a corresponding
portiQn of the annuity benefits is exempt.1 78
5. If the employee designates a beneficiary to take the benefits
after his death, the first $5000 received is exempt from the recipient's
income tax17 9 and the full amount paid to the beneficiary (except for
that part attributable to the employee's contributions) is exempt from
the estate tax.118
Negotiated accident and health plans are treated in the same
manner as unilateral insurance plans. Contributions of the employer
are not included in the gross income of the employee, 8 and are de-
ductible by the employer. 82 Amounts received by the employee under
the accident and health plan are generally included in the employee's
gross income except amounts received by the employee as reimburse-
ment of medical expenses incurred by him, sums that constitute pay-
ment for permanent disability and sums that constitute wages or
payment in lieu of wages during absence from work because of dis-
ability.1-
STATE TAX LAWS
If maximum advantage is taken, of the Internal Revenue Code in
the planning of an employee benefit plan, little more can be done to
gain additional advantages under the state tax laws. A minuscule
review of general aspects of state tax laws may, however, be sug-
gestive of additional precautions that may be taken.
Tax on Trust Property. The real property and tangible personalty
owned by employee benefit trusts are ordinarily taxable. Obligations
of the United States government are exempt from state taxation by
virtue of federal law. Bonds of a state and political godivisions
thereof are frequently exempt within the state and rarely outside the
state. Corporate bonds and securities held by trusts are fully taxable
in many states, but receive favored treatment in others.
Tax on Trust Income. One third of the states have no income taxes
at all. Of the rest, many states tax trust income as individual income,
that is, they tax net trust income less the amounts currently dis-
tributed or distributable to beneficiaries. "Mlost states allow some
special exemptions for employee trusts on the basis of qualifications
similar to those in the Internal Revenue Code.
178. If the employee has himself contributed, he may recoup that amount
through deductions each year by averaging his contributions against his life
expectancy. If the employee gets full benefits in one year, he may treat the
amount of his employer's contribution as a capital gain. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,§ 403.
179. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 101(b).
180. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2039(c).
181. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 106.
182. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 404.
183. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 105.
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Employers' Contributions to Welfare Funds. These are 'deductible
in income tax states in so far as they can be justified as necessary,
ordinary and reasonable expenses incurred in the general conduct of
business.
Employee's Contributions to Welfare Funds. These are treated as
payments for personal insurance and are not deductible from gross
income.
Tax on Benefits Received. Generally these are taxable but numerous
variations exist.
INSURANCE LAWS
Insurance laws are voluminous. Each state has a set of regulatory
statutes. They authorize certain companies to sell insurance; they
license brokers and agents; they spell out provisions of several dis-
tinct types of insurance; and they empower insurance commissioners
to supervise, inspect and administer the established principles of law.
The primary purpose of most of this legislation is to assure the sol-
vency of insurance companies although many provisions do serve to
furnish lay policyholders a reasonable opportunity to understand
their contractual rights.
These laws impinge upon employee benefit plans essentially through
provisions for group insurance. There are statutes governing group
life insurance, group disability insurance, group hospital and medical
service insurance and group annuity insurance. The National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners has approved and recommended
the enactment of model group insurance laws, and many states have
adopted model or similar provisions.-,
The following are some common provisions of group insurance
statutes tending to preserve the stability and clarity of employee
benefit plans. 8 5
1. Minimum Number of Insured. The laws have required a mini-
mum of insured employees for group coverage--originally 50, later 25
and now 10. They have also specified a minimum percentage of those
eligible who must be insured-generally 50% for disability and 75%
for life insurance. The group eligible has often been undefined so that
employees with other insurance or with special circumstances might
be excluded; whereas, permission is commonly extended for the in-
clusion of employees of affiliated employers,. officers and managers of
corporate employers and sole proprietors or partners.
184. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, PROCEEDINGS OF
ANNUAL SESSIONS 54 (1940); id. at 338 (1946); id. at 185 (1948); id. at 310
(1954).
185. For purposes of illustration, the California group insurance laws are cited.
CAL. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 10200-10213 (1950) (Group Life); id. §§ 10270.4-10275
(Supp. 1953) (Group Disability); id. §§ 11512.2-11512.3 (Supp. 1953) (Group
Hospital Service Contracts).
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2. New Employees. The laws have required that all new employees
eligible to, and applying for, insurance shall be added to the group
or class originally covered.
3. Individual Selection of Insurance Limited. The statutes have re-
quired a master policy based on a plan which will preclude individual
selection by members as to the amount of insurance coverage for any
particular employee. The risk is thereby kept common to a large
group.
4. Collection or Transmission of Premiums. Ordinarily the collec-
-tion or transmission of premiums has been made the responsibility of
the principal policyholder-an employer or trustees.
5. Individual Certificates. The laws have required insurance com-
panies to provide the policyholder with an individual certificate for
each insured, setting forth the benefits and exceptions applicable to
the insured.
6. Approval of Forms. Approval of all policy forms has been en-
trusted to the State Insurance Commissioners. Temporary plans for
a limited period (often 120 days) pending approval have been au-
thorized upon the filing of specified data.
7. Entirety of Contract. The policy and application forms have
been declared to constitute an entire contract. 'All statements by an
individual insured have been deemed, in the absence of fraud, to be
mere representations and not warranties. These terms have restricted
the defenses which might be raised against a benefit claim.
8. Effect on Workmen's Compensation. Group disability and hos-
pital service insurance policies have been required to state that they
are not in lieu of, and do not affect, any requirement for coverage
by workmen's compensation insurance.
9. New Rules and Regulations. The state insurance commissioners
have been authorized to promulgate additional rules and regulations
relating to the substance, form or issuance of any contract for group
insurance.
10. Special Group Life Insurance Rules. Group life policies have
been made uncontestable, except for nonpayment of premiums, after
they have been in existence an initial period. The maximum amount
of insurance for any one employee has been controlled by a ratio of it
to the minimum carried by other employees. Special clauses limiting
losses due to war, military service or aviation have been permitted.
- The penalty for an insured's misstatement of age has been restricted
to an equitable adjustment of benefits.
11. Special Group Annuity Rules. Companies writing group an-
nuity policies have been required to maintain a reserve fund adequate
to meet future payments calculated on specified mortality tables.
Washington University Open Scholarship
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
12. Special Group Hospital and Medical Insurance Rules. Since
most policies for medical and hospital insurance call for reimburse-
ment of expenses, the laws have provided that the expenses incurred
by any member of a family or a dependent (when such are covered)
shall be deemed to be incurred by the insured.
These standards for group insurance relate to the normal operations
of insurance companies. They do not reach the abuses recently high-
lighted in public investigations, such as the earning of excessive com-
missions and their division among peddlers of influence or the charg-
ing of excessive premiums. Commissions paid brokers and agents
have not been regulated by law. Nearly all states, however, do have
a law prohibiting any rebate in premiums or commissions. Proper
prosecution under these laws may correct some of the efforts of cor-
rupt union leaders and business men to convert group insurance to
their illicit gain. To the extent that commissions may be excessive for
services rendered by brokers, there has been no statutory restraint.
The premiums charged by insurance companies have also been a
matter of unregulated competition. The provisions of some statutes, -
and the regulations of some insurance commissioners, have been de-
signed to prevent premiums too low for profitable operation. There
has been no statutory control of excessive profits. Some policies and
insurance company practices provide for dividends or premium re-
funds; and statutes have required the policyholder receiving such
dividends or refunds to apply them (after paying for insurance and
administrative expenses) to the benefit of the insured employees
generally. Otherwise, insurance premiums have been uncontrolled.
The inspection of insurance company operations has been sys-
tematized for the country as a whole by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners. That organization has arranged for ex-
aminations to be held in six zones and for the results to be made avail-
able to all state commissioners. Every insurance company is examined
once every three years. The fiscal operations of each company are
inspected minutely. Group insurance policies and practices are
scrutinized along with other types of insurance. The objective, how-
ever, has been to determine the soundness of underwriting practices
and the stability of each particular company. The interrelations be-
tween insurance companies, brokers, union business agents and trus-
tees have not been investigated.
An even wider unregulated area has been the activities exempt
from or not embraced by insurance statutes. 8 6 Labor unions and
186. UNITED STATES CRAMBER OF CdMMERCE, STATE 'INSURANCE LAws AFFECT-
ING EMPLOYEE PENSION AND WELFARE FUNDS (1954). This publication is un-
fortunately confined to a poll of state insurance commissioners on laws regulating
programs administered by a labor organization or an employee. It by-passes most
employee benefit plans in so far as insurance companies are involved.
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their insurance schemes have been expressly exempted from the in-
surance laws of some states. Other laws have referred only to insur-
ance companies and defined them in such a way as not to include a
group, an industry or a trust fund maintaining a self-insurance
scheme or a direct service plan. New York has enacted a law author-
izing its superintendent of insurance to investigate all types of em-
ployee benefit plans;187 but whether that is the forerunner of regu-
lation covering employee benefit plans not involving insurance com-
panies is a matter of political speculation.
PROTECTION AGAINST ABUSES
The administration of employee benefit plans has been the subject
of investigation by committees of the United States Senate and the
House of Representatives, the New York Insurance Department, labor
organizations and management groups. 88 Though the inquiries still
continue, they have, disclosed numerous abuses, which, while not
characteristic of most plans, are sufficiently serious to warrant the
early adoption of preventive and punitive measures. The principal
abuses may be summarized as follows:
1. Abuses of Employers and/or Unions.
a) Negotiation under threats and violence.
b) Discrimination against nonunion employees.
c) Coercion of trustees' actions.
d) Failure to disclose personal dealings for profit.
2. Abuses of Insurance Companies, Brokers and Consultants.
a) Excessive premiums.
b) Excessive operating charges.
c) Excessive commissions.
d) Collusive advance opening of competitive bids.
3. Abuses of Trustees and Administrators.
a) Improper payment of claims.
b) Squandering of assets.
c) Improper investments.
d) False accounts.
187. N.Y. Laws 1954, c. 278 (effectiveMarch 27, 1954).
188. United States Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare Welfare
and Pension Plan Investigation, SEN. RES. 225, SEN. RES. 270, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1954); United States House Committee on Education and Labor, Investi-
gation of Welfare and Pension Funds, H.R. RES. 115, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954);
STATE OF NEW YORK INSURANCE DEP'T, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON UNION AND
EPLO'YER WELFARE. PLANS (1954); REPORT OF C.I.O. STANDING COMMITTEE ON
ETHICAL PRACTICES (1954); A.F. OF L., PROCEEDINGS OF SEVENTY-THIRD ANNUAL
CONVENTION, 573-76 (1954); UNITED STATES CHArBER OF COMMERCE, KIT Or
MATERIALS ON UNION WELFARE FUNDS (1954); UNITED STATES CHAIWER OF
CoM ERcE, LAsoR RELATIONS LETTER, Issues 120, 122, 123 (1954).
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Thoughtful analysis of these abuses and suggestions for their cor-
rection have come from several sources.s 9 Basically they all require
a willingness to face the problem and an eagerness to remedy it. The
national organizations of labor and management, Congress and the
leaders of the insurance industry have announced their readiness and
have taken forward steps. There remains great diversity in their
points of emphasis and specific proposals.
From the standpoint of existing doctrines of law, much can be
accomplished through contractual arrangements and proper enforce-
ment of present rights. By way of illustration, it is quite feasible for
the parties to a collective bargaining agreement or a welfare trust
agreement to require that:
1. The trustees or administrators of health, welfare and retire-
ment programs whether union, company, or joint, and all others
exercising responsibility in connection with such programs, have
the obligation to make sure that maximum benefits are provided
from the money available.
2. All welfare funds should be audited at least semiannually by
independent certified public accountants who should certify that
the audits fully and comprehensively show the financial condition
of the funds and the results of the operation of these funds.
3. There should be full disclosure and report to the beneficiaries
at least once a year by the trustees or administrators of all perti-
nent facts concerning the administration of welfare funds, in-
cluding detailed financial reports and audits which shall specify
the salaries, expenses and fees paid in connection with the ad-
ministration of the program, to whom paid, and how much and
for what purpose.
4. Persons occupying full time paid positions with unions or
companies should not receive additional compensation for acting
as trustees or administrators of their own organization's health,
welfare and retirement funds.
5. Where welfare benefits are carried through an insurance
company, the carrier should be selected through genuinely com-
petitive bids on the basis of the lowest net cost for given benefits
provided by a responsible company. The company should warrant
that no fee has been paid directly or indirectly to any represen-
tative of the parties in connection with the coverage provided.
6. The insurance carriers should be required to file statements
with the trustees or administrators of welfare programs specify-
ing claim experience, commissions paid by the carriers, to whom
paid, retentions, and amounts of dividends received and to whom
paid. This information should be made available by the trustees
or administrators to the beneficiaries. 190
189. United States Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Welfare
and Pension Plan Investigation, supra note 188; REPowR or C.I.O. STANDING
COMMITTEE ON ETHICAL PRACTICES (1954).
190. REPORT OF C..O. STANDING COMIITTE ON ETHICAL PRACTICES, 18-19
(1954).
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Insistence upon such contract provisions and their enforcement
would do much to correct current abuses. To accomplish such pro-
tection in cases in which contracts are not carefully drawn, it may be
necessary to have additional legislation.
The problem of controlling insurance commissions, retentions,
operating charges and premiums is an exceedingly difficult one to
regulate by law. Proper authorization of group insurance to take
care of the new needs of employee benefit plans seems clearly indi-
cated, and with such laws should come regulatory provisions.91 The
insurance industry has fought bitterly against federal regulation, and
proper inspection of company practices under state laws requires a
large degree of cooperation among state departments. Whether regu-
lation should be state or federal and the extent to which company
practices can be controlled are matters that can not be settled for
years. Realistically, some beginning may be made promptly by state
insurance commissioners themselves; legislatures that have been
loath to adopt the uniform statutes heretofore recommended by most
authorities in the field are not likely to take revolutionary action
at this time. New York has pointed the way by subjecting records of
employee benefit plans to the inspection of the state insurance com-
missioner.92
Federal laws requiring full disclosure, inspection and supervision,
and enforcement of honest accounting have been suggested. If any
lesson is to be learned from experience with the LMRA, it should be
that penal sanctions are practically impossible to enforce and that ad-
ministrative control is complicated and costly. Still, if positive results
are to be achieved, it will be necessary to utilize administrative agen-
cies and procedures. Mere filing or publication of reports, as now
required for the finances of unions, is of very little value. Inspection
and supervision as are required for national banks would be effective,
but such measures require extensive machinery. Whether the mere
fact that billions of dollars and millions of workers are involved is
enough to justify the expense is a political question.
Fundamentally, the legal principles of contracts, agency and trust
are sufficient to afford adequate remedy for most abuses in employee
benefit plans. Equitable doctrines make available swift injunctive
remedies. Criminal statutes provide numerous grounds for the punish-
ment of dishonest: or corrupt dealings, The real need in this relatively
new field of labor relations is to learn to use existing legal facilities
to the best advantage. A positive approach to what responsible labor
and management desire in employee benefit plans calls for full utiliza-
tion of contractual powers and for optimum use of trusts, group in-
191. ILSE, GRoup INSURANCE AND Er.nmoym RE-iREuENT PLANS 46-84 (1958).
192. N.Y. Laws 1954, c. 278 (effective March 27, 1954).
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surance, medical care plans and whatever schemes men of intelligence
and good will can devise. Governmental aids in the keeping, dis-
closure, inspection and supervision of records, and possibly in the fees
and charges for services rendered, may help. The law of employee
benefit plans should be adapted to the needs and experiences of the
persons involved. Since those needs and experiences are still in a
state of growth, the law should be kept viable.
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